the theoretical and practical considerations involved in the choice of efficient and effective methods for the organization of personal, library, and technical information center files. Exhibits and demonstrations of nonconventional methods will concentrate on the problems raised by the increasing demands of specialization and interdisciplinary research in scholarly disciplines.

ERRATUM: On the cover of Volume XXXI, No. 2, the name of Hyman Muslin should have been included as co-author with George H. Pollock as is correctly recorded in the article itself.

ON PSYCHOANALYTIC TRAINING

BY SIEGFRIED BERNFELD, PH.D.

AN INTRODUCTION

Ten years ago, on November 10, 1952, a few months before his death on April 2, 1953, Siegfried Bernfeld gave his last paper before the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society and Institute. Not surprisingly, this contribution of a teacher of psychoanalysis for some thirty years concerned itself with the issue of psychoanalytic training. He had inspired generations of young analysts, who trained with him or knew him through his writings, by his search for truth, even when painful, his personal honesty and scientific integrity, and by his deep commitment to psychoanalysis. He spoke unsparingly of himself or others, forthrightly and with passion. This last essay will testify to these qualities. And, still, it is with hesitancy that I have prepared his manuscript for publication.

Had Bernfeld himself prepared the paper for publication, he would most likely have cut out the autobiographical remarks. And it would have had a totally different character, representing his ideas in his usual objective form. As the paper stands now, it is a document of Bernfeld's troubled reactions to the problems of psychoanalytic training.

Bernfeld's address as usual was given extempore, but we had his first draft with a few of his own assembled corrections. I also had available an almost identical manuscript, assembled by Bernice Engle and Peter Paret from notes taken by some members of the audience as well as by a stenographer.

I have made but few changes, such as exchanging a word here or there in order to make sure that the meaning intended would come across. I have omitted a few repetitions. I have left certain anecdotes and expressions in the text which he might have eliminated from a printed version, but which seemed to retain the flavor of his personal style and his powerful capacity to communicate to an audience his ideas as well as his feelings through the spoken word.

As the reader will see, more than historical interest and sentiment warrant the publication of this speech that contains thoughts

and observations which Bernfeld had not had the time to prepare with his usual care.

Even today, ten years later, we face essentially the same problems which concerned Bernfeld at that time. And are they different from those described in his early book, published in 1925, Sisyphus or the Boundaries of Education?[1] They are the problems felt most strongly by one whose primary identification was with the process of teaching rather than with the organization of training. Some two years before this address—on January 10, 1950—after a thorough discussion in Orinda among the members of the Education Committee of the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute, he had directed a communication to the members of the Education Committee in which he prepared fourteen points concerning The 'Free' Institute. This 'free' institute, a proposal of an ideal training setup, was his attempt to counteract the dangers of institutionalization and, like all Utopias, it was a return to those early days of the pioneers of which he spoke in his last lecture to the society.

In 'point fourteen' of this communication, he says: 'At the present time most psychoanalysts wish to keep the training integrated within organized psychoanalysis. Some of their motives and arguments are in my opinion well worth consideration. Therefore it is probably the wiser course to take the program of a "free" institute only as a sort of "regulative" and to introduce only some of its features into the existing setup in order to see how much improvement in the working of our institute would result.'

Some psychoanalysts believed that his paper on training was the result of his conviction that discussions within education committees had become fruitless. He had therefore resigned from the training committee to give his last statement directly to the society as one student to the others. He took this step to oppose the prevailing trend in psychoanalytic training across the country.

I prefer to think of his criticism and of his expressed scepticism in a different way. I do not really believe he was ever actually identified with the kind of psychoanalytic education characterized through his autobiographical comment concerning his experience with Freud. After all, he did decide after these first experiences as a young analyst to arrange for his personal analysis as well as further training, even though he did this against a social and historical background completely different from the one we face today, particularly on the American scene.

[1] Bernfeld, Siegfried: *Sisyphus oder Die Grenzen der Erziehung*. Leipzig, Vienna: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1925.

He opposes the school setting of organized training in the same spirit and philosophy that he opposed, in his early experiments and contributions on education, the authoritarian school setting. He proposes instead a progressive and student-centered educational process rather than a teacher-centered training system. His gift as a teacher, his understanding of adolescents, of children, and of students of analysis stemmed from a basic identification with them rather than with adult authority or the institutional setting.

The ten years since that lecture have seen much discussion about training, and many analysts have been immersed in a careful reconsideration of many related issues, including those he mentioned. To mention a few contributions: the studies on supervision summarized recently by DeBell,[2] Lewin and Ross's survey of all aspects of training in their Psychoanalytic Education in the United States,[3] studies on selection by Holt and Luborsky,[4] the teaching of technique discussed by Ekstein and by Ekstein and Wallerstein,[5] who suggest that supervisory techniques be viewed not in terms of 'teacher-centered' or 'student-centered' but rather in terms of 'process-centered' techniques.

But, by and large, all the issues mentioned and others continue to plague us and still need the kind of honest and searching evaluation Bernfeld requires of us.

His 'free' institute, reminiscent of the days of the early pioneers who worked together in very small groups, is essentially a plea to maintain the spirit of psychoanalytic education. He fears that administrative considerations, struggles about minimum requirements, admissions policies, etc., will become stronger than the original

[2] DeBell, Daryl: *A Critical Digest of the Literature on Psychoanalytic Supervision*. Unpublished.

[3] Lewin, Bertram D. and Ross, Helen: *Psychoanalytic Education in the United States*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1960.

[4] Holt, Robert and Luborsky, Lester: *Personality Patterns of Psychiatrists: A Study of Methods for Selecting Residents*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1958.

[5] Ekstein, Rudolf: *A Historical Survey of the Teaching of Psychoanalytic Technique*. J. Amer. Psa. Assn., VIII, 1960, pp. 500-516; and Ekstein, Rudolf and Wallerstein, Robert S.: *The Teaching and Learning of Psychotherapy*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1958.

purpose—to maintain classical psychoanalysis as a creative, a growing science. In pessimistic moments, we all fear that there is such a thing as 'Parkinson's Law', a seemingly unavoidable must for an ever-increasing number of committees and subcommittees, producing an administrative setup which drowns out the original purposes. Administration then, according to that law, rather than being an advancing of training and education and of research activity, becomes more and more an end in itself. But I take his last forceful address before the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society to mean that he was not truly pessimistic and did not accept this type of process of institutionalization as a universal law, and that he saw it rather as a transitory growth crisis which can be resolved if teachers and administrators complement their functions and agree on basic purposes.

I believe that most of his colleagues in San Francisco and his students understood him that way. The invitation to the first memorial lecture for Bernfeld, offered in 1954 by Ernst Kris, speaks of Bernfeld as one 'of that second generation of psychoanalysts, trained in the tradition of Sigmund Freud, who, uprooted from their European homes, came to enrich the intellectual life of this country through their teaching, writing, and research. Dr. Bernfeld's scientific contributions to education, child psychology, psychoanalytic theory, and to the biography and milieu of Sigmund Freud are internationally known. . . . For the last decade, his colleagues in the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society and psychoanalysts and students trained in the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute have known and been inspired by the example of intellectual honesty and integrity he has set, and by his devotion to the science and art of psychoanalysis.'

RUDOLF EKSTEIN, PH.D.

Tonight I invite you to give thought to the question: How should one teach psychoanalysis? Obviously, this invitation implies that I am not satisfied with the manner in which analysis is presently taught in institutes the world over; in fact, I am very sceptical of our psychoanalytic training program and procedures.

I have participated in the work of several institutes: those of Vienna, of Berlin, and of San Francisco. I have passed sufficient time in London and in Paris, and I have occasionally been intimate enough with the Budapest and Los Angeles groups to permit me to form a clear picture of the training work undertaken by these institutes. With none of these was I ever closely identified, but for thirty years now I have spent a good part of my working life in lecturing to the candidates and in analyzing them. This position, somewhat on the periphery of the institutes, has perhaps given me a clearer view of their structure and function than I could have gained had I participated in program and policy making in administration; that is, I was a teacher of psychoanalysis long before any institutes existed. Later I observed, and—for a short time—took part in, the discussions and struggles that led to the formal organization of analytic training. Some of the analysts who have built up our training system with so much care and energy may object to certain of the criticisms to follow. By stressing my status as a veteran, I hope to make it easier for them to dismiss my observations with a shrug: 'These arguments were valid in the 'twenties; they are terribly old-fashioned now'. But I also elaborate these autobiographical facts to impress you duly with my age and experience: I may need your 'transference' tonight. I shall have to say some unpleasant things, and a few that perhaps have never been said before, at least not from the lecture platform of a psychoanalytic society.

Our institutes have grown impressively in numbers and size, and in complexity of administration. But the substance of their programs has not developed or changed much in the thirty years of their existence. It has not changed since their begin-

ning, when the triad of personal analysis, supervised analysis, and seminars was instituted. The expectations concerning the results of the institute's training system have remained unchanged, as have the methods of conducting supervision and seminars. While psychoanalysis has revolutionalized education and the student-teacher relationship, the institutes are carrying on with a teaching system that is prepsychoanalytic, fully teacher-centered, and dominated by questions of administration and policy. The idea of a student-centered system is quite alien to our institutes; and, what is even worse, matters of local policies and administration are mainly decided by a national committee, according to the interest of the national professional association, whereas according to psychoanalytic theory and practice it is obvious that nothing should count so heavily as the concrete local human relationships.

The citing of these facts should not be taken as a reproach. Our training programs are run by very busy analysts—most of them physicians—in their spare time; frequently therefore they do not permit experimentation and we fall back on teaching methods of the past. The teacher-centered, prepsychoanalytic school comes easily to mind, while a psychoanalytic, student-centered school, demands reasoning and experimentation, and it meets resistances and must be conceived and conducted against natural and archaic teaching instincts.

Nor would I say that our institutes are of no value. They do fulfil their purpose: they turn out I think a remarkable percentage of competent analysts; but they do so while producing what is called in electronics, 'noise'—such loud noise that the psychoanalytic message does not come through to the students clearly and steadily. My thesis is this: the training that is conducted in our professional schools distorts some of the most valuable features of psychoanalysis and hinders its development as a science and as a tool by means of which to change behavior.

My statements that the institutes carry out their training obligations but, on the other hand, that they are detrimental

to psychoanalysis may seem contradictory; yet the paradox simply expresses one of the most important insights of the psychoanalytic theory of education. Unfortunately, too many analysts seem hardly aware of the theory's basic content. Permit me, therefore, to explain the relevant points as briefly as possible.

How are children best taught to read? Many methods of instruction were used in the history of education; the old-fashioned system, for instance, that some of us may remember, in which the teacher was the unquestionable intellectual and disciplinary authority—a being of another, higher, world. The children had to sit stiffly and silently, their eyes fixed on the teacher's mouth, reciting in sing-song, together or singly, some important bit of knowledge. They were scolded, humiliated, and beaten by this godly majesty (the teacher) whenever they showed signs of disobedience or—what was considered the same—of ignorance. This was the teacher-centered, brutally authoritarian school. Then there existed and still exists a more lenient authoritarian system, in which corporal punishment is abolished and the children are permitted some means of comfort and relaxation, but the controlling position of the teacher has hardly changed. This type we all know. There also exist a few, but very relevant, progressive, student-centered schools, where the teacher stays in the background, guiding the children's creative and learning activities, with the barest minimum of interference, and where there are almost no disciplinary tasks or rules.

If you consider the subject of reading in these different systems, you will find that however they are taught, all normal children will learn to read, most of them within a year, some within a matter of weeks, and a few in two years. It is strange but a fact nevertheless that normal children learn to read, whatever method one's fancy chooses to teach them by.

There is however a great difference in *how*, as adults, they will use this acquired skill. Not many who were subjected to the authoritarian system ever read willingly and to very few

of these will books ever become teachers and friends. Most are forever excluded from the world of literature. To the majority of those who learned reading under more progressive systems, this world remains open. There is, however, a more important difference. It is obvious that the various systems influence thought and the personality of the child in different ways. In all schools children learn to read. But in some of them the exercise of power and of violence is likely to become a part of their ego ideal.

The decisive factors to observe in educational theory are therefore the conditions under which reading—or any other skill—is acquired. The side effects that spring from them are of the most far-reaching educational influence. You are made painfully aware of their power when you attempt to change an existing school system. Try to argue with a partisan of the authoritarian way of teaching; try to convince him that there are means other than beating by which to teach children; try to show him that under a more individualistic system children not only learn to read but also learn to love reading; and you will soon find that he values discipline more highly than the love of intellectual achievement.

These, certainly, are truisms not worth mentioning here were it not that our analysts seem to maintain at one and the same time two contradictory attitudes on the matter as soon as it affects their own specialty: one, a hope that analysis will be taught and learned perfectly—which is unrealistic; the other, a bureaucratic view, that analysis is a subject to be taken as one takes, for instance, courses in anatomy—which, of course, is unpsychoanalytic. It appears to be quite forgotten that for the analyst, psychoanalysis is a method—still a weak and an imperfect one—for repairing some of the damage incurred in the accidents and incidents of growing up. For the analysand it may be one more tool for self-improvement; the measure of his achievement depends on his strengthened will in the use of this method during and after his personal analysis.

Unlike children learning to read, our students are adults;

therefore little danger exists that training analysts will spoil their characters. At the same time, psychoanalysis is a more complicated subject than the alphabet. At this point the general character of our psychoanalytic schools should be briefly described. Like most professional schools, they are founded on a kind of contract between student and school. If the student submits to the requirements, he will receive a diploma or its equivalent in money and prestige. Under such a system there seems hardly any need, perhaps no place, for progressive theories of education. In no way does the training need to be student-centered. Most students will gladly accept what they are given, as long as the money and prestige, supplied in due time by the diploma, appear worthy of their efforts.

Such schools however are entirely dependent on one condition: the existence of relatively simple and objective means for testing whether the requirements have been satisfactorily fulfilled. If such objective tests—be they mere attendance records, or examinations—do not exist (and psychoanalysis, unlike, for instance, reading or anatomy, does not much lend itself to them), then admission, promotion, and graduation will be largely influenced by irrational factors. The teachers then grow into excessively important personages and most of the students are strongly tempted to ingratiate themselves with their analysts and to convince everyone in authority of their powers of compliance. Finally, if the psychoanalytic courses are numerous and lengthy, the school—although a school for adults—is likely to develop in its students, at least temporarily, what we call infantile and puerile features. What happens to psychoanalysis if it is taught in such a school? I will restrict my answer to but one, though perhaps the most important, facet of its program: the personal analysis.

The idea of personal analysis is not much younger than psychoanalysis itself. Freud was early impressed by the difficulty of communicating his findings; obviously they could not be demonstrated to others like other work of a clinical nature. There was only one way in which Freud's propositions could

be tested, namely by an analysis of the tester—either by his self-analysis or by a personal analysis. From the late nineties on, students in Freud's classes occasionally submitted their dreams to him. Sometimes a physician or a psychologist asked his help in the treatment of neurotic symptoms. These early analyses were truly didactic. Freud was eager to show neurotic mechanisms and the repressions of childhood traumata; he wanted to demonstrate their workings and his methods of exploration. I have read letters he wrote in the twenties in which he discussed prospective didactic analyses with several aspirants. Even then he was ready to give an introduction to psychoanalysis by means of self-observation, so to speak. He considered periods of a few months as sufficient for this, or rather as better than nothing.

Around 1905, Freud began conducting analyses with psychoanalysts of much longer duration and far higher therapeutic aims. He adjusted the duration of the analysis and the amount of straight teaching included in it according to the wishes and the circumstances of the student-patient and according to the nature of the neurotic complaints. Whenever he deemed it advisable, he included didactic material in the personal analysis. With many of his students he discussed psychoanalytic theory, their own patients, the politics of the young group, and the papers they intended to write. In general, he tended to let the analysis grow into a relationship between two colleagues, one of whom happened to know a little more than the other. From the first to the very end, Freud kept his didactic cases absolutely free from interference by rules, administrative directives, or political considerations. His teaching was completely student-centered (to use my pedagogical terminology) or more simply he acted as a psychoanalyst should. He continued this long after the establishment of institutes, to the dismay and embarrassment of 'the authorities', as he sometimes, and a little ironically, referred to them.

For example, in 1922 I discussed with Freud my intention of establishing myself in Vienna as a practicing analyst. I had

been told that our Berlin group encouraged psychoanalysts, especially beginners, to have a didactic analysis before starting their practice, and I asked Freud whether he thought this preparation desirable for me. His answer was: 'Nonsense. Go right ahead. You certainly will have difficulties. When you get into trouble, we will see what we can do about it.' Only a week later, he sent me my first didactic case, an English professor who wished to study psychoanalysis and planned to stay in Vienna about one month. Alarmed by the task and the conditions, I went back to Freud; but he only said: 'You know more than he does. Show him as much as you can.'

This, I still believe, would be the ideal training atmosphere, though I quite understand the strong motives and good reasons that led to the formalization of training. Yet I have never been fully convinced that the weaknesses of a school-like organization are outweighed by its advantages.

In the history of didactic psychoanalysis, two periods are fairly well marked. The first reaches from the inception of analysis to the winter of 1923-1924. During this period Freud conducted the above-described personal analyses of analysts and of individuals who were professionally interested in analysis. But not only Freud, Abraham, Ferenczi, Federn, in fact everyone who knew more than a newcomer and felt inclined and competent, did the same, each in his own way.

I myself had heard of Freud and of his *Die Traumdeutung* for the first time in 1907; occasionally I read one of his books or papers, until finally in 1910 I became really interested in the new science. Then, of course, I began to analyze my dreams and some of my fantasies and actions and to read whatever was available by or against psychoanalysts. So did a few of my fellow psychology students, and when the occasion presented itself I analyzed their dreams and applied psychoanalysis in my scientific and pedagogic work. Before I joined the Vienna Society in 1913, I analyzed, in about fifty sessions, an acute symptom of a fellow student.

It is, by the way, unthinkable to me that anyone could be-

come interested in psychoanalysis as a science or therapy without desiring to test on himself what he had read and to increase his understanding of himself, to regain contact with his forgotten childhood, and to obtain relief from some of his neurotic difficulties. Most likely he will soon find that self-analysis can neither satisfy his curiosity nor really help him in his troubles. He will then turn for personal analysis to some one who seems to know more and seems to deserve his trust.

At the end of this first period, an important step was taken by the Berlin group. Many of its members felt the need for a personal analysis but hesitated to reveal their secrets to a local psychoanalyst. Also, the newly founded psychoanalytic clinic attracted a few physicians who wished to work there, and at the same time learn psychoanalysis. Consequently, Hanns Sachs was invited to move from Vienna to Berlin and to specialize in the analysis of psychoanalysts, established ones as well as beginners. He thus became the first training analyst. Sachs, as you know, was not a physician and had at that time very little therapeutic experience. He soon found it too difficult to analyze and simultaneously to supervise the therapeutic work of his analysands, in addition to discussing theory and technique with them. He therefore, and very wisely so, purged the personal analysis of all didactic material and referred such problems to the classes and seminars that he and others were conducting in the clinic. This procedure was and still is followed by all training analysts.

Late in 1923 or early in 1924 the training committee of the Berlin Society decided to streamline its activities. It prepared to offer a complete teaching course to those psychiatrists who accepted, among others, the following terms: the committee to admit or reject the candidate irrevocably according to the impression gained in three preliminary interviews with him; the candidate to undergo first a personal analysis of at least six months duration: the training analyst to be designated by the committee; the committee—on the advice of the training analyst—to decide when the analysis was sufficiently advanced

for the candidate to participate in further stages of training; and further, to decide when his personal analysis could be considered completed. The candidate was to promise, in writing, that he would not call himself a psychoanalyst before his formal admission to the society.

This selection from the requirements for admission that were announced in Berlin almost thirty years ago ought to bear out sufficiently my earlier statement that our training program has not changed much since it was first instituted. At that time, however, this statement of policy was something unheard of in the psychoanalytic world. Some analysts hailed it as a solution of the basic problem. Others were sceptical. Others again, including myself, felt certain that the decision taken in Berlin, far from solving the problems we had to meet rather was to complicate our tasks.

In retrospect, from an experience gained in thirty years, we can better understand the factors that brought about the new policy of the Berlin group. Most of the older analysts had been amazed and even terrified when it became apparent after the war that, so to say, underground analysis had grown to full stature. By 1920 Freud unexpectedly found himself and psychoanalysis world famous. To us younger people this seemed of course neither amazing nor terrifying. For several years we had foreseen the change, and now the expected cultural revolution was breaking loose around us in Germany and in Austria. Psychologists, educators, social workers, the whole youth movement, the education departments of the socialist parties and of the new democratic governments all began to adjust their actions, ideas, and even institutions along psychoanalytic lines, though generally according to the more shallow Adlerian theories. Most of our older members neither knew much about these fundamental social changes nor did they care to know. But finally, when one could hardly open a newspaper or go to a nightclub or show without hearing some reference to psychoanalysis or a crack against it, they became alarmed and developed strong xenophobic attitudes in their desire to perpetu-

ate that isolation to which they had grown accustomed and to erect dams against this flood of general interest.

Except for a very few socialist doctors, the medical profession in Germany was solidly against the new era. Psychoanalysis was looked down on as definitely not respectable, although even among physicians interest in analysis was already on the increase, especially among younger psychiatrists who were beginning to turn to psychotherapy. But, strange to say, the psychoanalysts themselves desired respectability. They wished to set themselves up as part of the medical profession, and in order to achieve this aim they felt they had to have clinics, professional schools, and professional societies.

The psychoanalytic societies had until then been rather obscure. They were small scientific clubs, made up of a few outcasts and escapees from the medical profession and of some of the nonmedical *avant-garde*. They were devoted to the development and application of Freud's inventions and theories, and their contribution—as now became apparent—had acted as an important ferment or catalyst. The day arrived when the psychoanalytic societies were forced to adjust themselves to the new reality which they themselves had germinated.

The question now was how to adjust. In Vienna, close to Freud, we preferred the idea of offering the new movement opportunities for serious study of psychoanalysis and for the application of analysis to all the fields of therapy and education. In Berlin, the tendency was rather to isolate the psychoanalytic societies clearly from the general analytic movement, and gradually to establish psychoanalysis as a specialty within the medical profession. As a compromise, the clinics in Vienna and Berlin decided to include in their training program some provisions for the training of nonphysicians. But with greater and greater intensity their purpose came to be the issuing of diplomas in psychoanalysis. In the long run, the Berlin tendency won out.

Most important, however, for the development of those features of our training that I am discussing tonight was Freud's illness. As you may remember, in the summer of 1923, Freud's

cancer was discovered, and everyone, including himself and his doctors, expected him to die within a few months. By the summer of the following year it was fairly well established that the cancer was under control, and that Freud could hope to live many years longer.

I need not explain in detail what Freud's 'death and resurrection' within this one year meant to the older psychoanalysts in Vienna and Berlin—to those who for a decade or more had fought alongside him, who had shared his triumphs and failures, to whom he was the incomparable leader, but to whose unconscious he was father and God, ambivalently hated and loved.

There were, as you would expect, outbursts of the id forces and reaction-formations against them. The case of Rank may quite suitably illustrate the outburst of the id. For Rank, Freud's impending death had been the signal to go his own way. Since he was impatient and had started his departure somewhat too early, he found himself on Freud's recovery with his bridges burned and could only advance into nowhere. Some of the others grew intensely anxious because of the threatened loss, and became very eager to establish a solid dam against heterodoxy, as they now felt themselves responsible for the future of psychoanalysis. They determined to limit by rigid selection among the newcomers, and by the institution of a coercive, long drawn-out trial period of authoritarian training, any final admission to their societies. In fact, they punished their students for their own ambivalence. At the same time, they consolidated the one trend that Freud always had wanted to avoid: the shrinkage of psychoanalysis into an annex of psychiatry.

These irrational motives of xenophobia and guilt feelings introduced melancholy traits into our training. It so happened that these were quite in keeping with the Prussian spirit that rather flourished among the founders of the Berlin Institute.

I have spoken of some of the unconscious motives that caused our training to be streamlined in order to explain historically

how the present system came into being. I am sure that you will not substitute this analysis of the motives for an evaluation of the results. You must keep in mind that once the institutes had been founded, a new set of motives kept them going, and most likely they were quite different from the ones that had brought the institutes into being.

Whatever the original motives were, tonight our question must be: How well does the institution stand up after thirty years of experience? How does the student benefit from the training analysis? What exactly is its preparatory function? We do not know. In thirty years we have not learned much about these matters. Who has inquired into these issues? Some training analysts have given us their personal opinions. But are these sufficient to justify rationally the status of the personal analysis as obligatory preparation for the first phase of training?

In psychoanalysis, as elsewhere, institutionalization does not encourage thinking. For the young psychiatrist who wishes to become an analyst, as well as for his teachers in the institute, a training analysis is simply part of the professional reality to which all must conform. Most students find it beneficial, some very much so, and that is enough to encourage psychoanalysts to have a personal analysis. But in my opinion it is not enough to satisfy the scientific curiosity that is a basic ingredient of freudian psychoanalysis. Allow me to consider the question somewhat more closely.

In the first place, the training analysis has no equivalent in other teaching institutions. We are proud of this peculiarity. In fact, however, we tend to consider the personal analysis as one more of the many required courses. At least we allow the students and the public to conceive of it as something equivalent to a course in, let us say, anatomy. As medical schools require anatomy classes in the preparatory curriculum, so do we require a training analysis as the basic preliminary part of our training. We wish to assure high professional standards and give protection to the public, exactly as do the medical schools. This argument, one of the strongest in favor of organized training, is not altogether faulty, but it is unrealistic.

In an anatomy class, the student acquires a certain knowledge or skill that, with relatively few modifications, will remain the same throughout his life. What the physician knows about this subject a year or two after his examinations is probably just what he will know for the entire span of his practice. It is quite different with analysis. A training analysis gives little knowledge and no skill. It might be compared to the tuning-up of an engine—a process that may or may not be sufficient for life. If you consult a reputable M.D. you can be sure that he has had a thorough and permanently usable grounding in anatomy. When you make an appointment with a member in good standing in the Psychoanalytic Association you know as little of what you may expect from him as you would if you bought a used automobile without making certain when it was last overhauled.

But must not every psychoanalyst be analyzed? I think every psychotherapist ought to have a personal analysis, and that he ought to repeat the performance whenever he feels the need. As I have mentioned earlier, I can hardly imagine a psychotherapist who would not desire a personal analysis, who would not do all in his power to get one for himself. A moderately skilful psychoanalyst may become a good one after his personal analysis, and a good one may turn into a master. Or, the analysis may have no influence on his work. Still it may have helped him personally, and thus increased his competence. Or it may not. Some people achieve great intellectual improvement through self-analysis; others grow quiet and more resigned. And some—and this perhaps should be stressed—go through their analysis untouched and unchanged. Analysis is desirable—yes, I go further, even necessary; but I doubt that the essential benefits materialize when the personal analysis is 'taken' in the same spirit as one takes an anatomy course or final examination.

The reason for my doubt is plain. We are all in agreement that the nature and strength of the motive which brings the patient into analysis is one of the most important factors in his therapy. We also agree, I think, that psychoanalysis is not indi-

cated when the patient lacks a strong and genuine motive for treatment. Compliance with the demands of authority—of whatever nature—is quite generally considered a poor motive for analysis. Patients who wish to be psychoanalyzed in order to gain equality with their friends or to win prestige are indeed very poor prognostic bets.

On what possible grounds do we waive these counterindications in the case of our training candidates? To continue, I believe it is especially unfortunate that we schedule the required self-analysis with such heavy rigidity. In the natural course of an analyst's career occur two phases when the intellectual motives for personal analysis may be very strong. When he first grows seriously interested in psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, and psychology, and considers these fields as his possible vocation, he will ask: 'How true and how important are psychotherapy and psychoanalysis? How neurotic am I, myself? Can I be helped?' These and similar questions should bring him to personal analysis just about when he has decided on his profession, and at this time his motives will be sufficiently strong and clear-cut to carry him through a personal analysis of some length and depth. According to our training regulations, however, a candidate must be a physician and a specialist in psychiatry before he is permitted to start his didactic analysis. This is of course much too late to satisfy the legitimate doubts, curiosity, and insecurity relative to his career as psychoanalyst.

The second natural phase occurs after the psychoanalyst has had years of experience and discovers that he is not as competent, as secure, and as happy in his work as he had hoped to be. For the satisfaction of this need our rules insist on an analysis at far too early a day. That is, we force the young psychiatrist to take his didactic analysis long after he has decided on his career but long before he can have had much experience. Our rules force him into didactic analysis at exactly the stage when, after years and years as a student, he reaches independence. Now he must face the prospect of many additional years as a candidate and as a student under rigid supervision. One wonders just how abstract psychoanalysts can become.

Permit me now to discuss for a few minutes a matter which strictly speaking is not a problem of training, but is rather closely connected with it: the selection of candidates. Obviously if we have more applicants than positions, we must at the outset decide whether to make selections on the basis of mechanical criteria—alphabet, seniority, influence, and so forth—or by relative ability for the job. Since naturally our institutes have decided on quality criteria, the only alternative seems to be either to observe the applicants on a trial run or assess their potentialities by some kind of prognostic evaluation. All institutes, I believe, have decided on preliminary selection. In the case of psychoanalysis it seems to be a teleological decision. Equally obvious is it that the candidates to be assessed must meet their assessor who will, by various methods, try to reach a clear and distinct judgment about those qualities or potentials on which his actual interest is focused. Which methods he uses depend on the assessor's psychology, on his experience with the production of such judgments, the nature of the qualities to be assessed, the time available, the procedures prescribed, the methods permissible. In general, assessors reach a clear judgment by making ranking judgments instead of absolute ones (A is stronger than B and weaker than C in respect to . . .).

The judgments in question here are neither logical nor moral judgments. They belong, at least partly, to a very interesting class of mental phenomena, related to intuition, which I studied many years ago and at that time called physiognomic judgments. When we perceive somebody's facial features or his gait and voice and know almost immediately that he is hostile, friendly, grabbing, generous, etc., we then experience in ourselves a primitive physiognomic judgment in the narrow sense of the word. When after a one-hour conversation, we leave a person, knowing clearly that he is trustworthy in certain matters or that he has the knack for analysis, we experience a complex judgment in which the basic component is of the nature of such a physiognomic judgment. My study showed me that considerable individual differences exist—frequency, ease, clearness,

and precision—through which individuals experience physiognomic judgment. Some people have strong defenses against physiognomic perceptions. Some feel defenses lessen under strong fatigue, the influence of alcohol, etc. Some people know and accept physiognomic experiences as an integral part of their human relationships and have learned to trust them. Some good, practical psychologists belong in this group. I find myself at the opposite extreme.

In the present selection of candidates the physiognomic judgment has necessarily a prominent place.

We do make diagnoses too. We recognize, for instance, the symptom of a psychosis or the expression of oral regression. In some cases the diagnostic insights are prevalent; in others they are in the background. The assessor probably rates the cases with prevalent diagnostic decisions as the easy ones, but they are the more rare ones, I think.

Anyhow, whether this is true or not, the assessment cannot be reduced to diagnosis because we do not pass judgment on actual qualities. To put it briefly, we predict the future. We form an opinion about what the candidate will be like after he goes through a psychoanalysis. There is not yet a diagnostic system invented which permits predictions of this type. Of course, those aspirants whose treatment offers the best prognostic chance—namely, the ones who openly ask for help in their neurotic troubles—we are inclined to reject altogether. Secondly, we do not know what a good psychoanalyst looks like. We may know—although I doubt that we do—what the required qualities for a psychoanalyst are, but we do not know what 'symptoms' these qualities produce in the assessment situation, during the allotted assessment time. Therefore, regardless of the amount of diagnostic decisions, the essential factor in the selection remains a physiognomic judgment. From this follows —among other things—that only those gifted in making physiognomic judgments should be permitted to select students. At least, persons should be eliminated who, because of their resistance, are unwilling or clumsy in the handling of their own physiognomic, judicial activities.

Is the selection thus produced irrational? I prefer to say that in its essential feature it is prerational. Is it not therefore to be condemned? Certainly not. Should we not vote, not choose reliable friends, not regulate our budget on predictions about our patients—all activities in which physiognomic judgments play an essential part? Scientifically trained men, the M.D. and the Ph.D. for example, have habitually a bad conscience when they pass physiognomic judgments or when they are made aware that they have used them, especially when this occurs in their professional field. But it does no good to deny that the selection of candidates for the institutes is essentially a nonscientific, namely a prerational procedure. To admit this is to take the first step in improving the procedure and in weighing intelligently its advantages and disadvantages. The general trend of thinking runs toward improving the selection procedure by increasing its diagnostic sector and by introducing test batteries or their equivalents. I am convinced that this program will not essentially help the situation, that is, in the foreseeable future.

For the sake of argument I suggest discussing this prospect anyhow. In the last decade testing, screening, and assessing have made tremendous progress under the pressure of the needs of business and of planned efficiency. It now seems quite possible to psychologists that they can devise or order a suitable method for any specialized assessment problem. True, to achieve this goal in certain cases may require a research project of highly complex studies, occupying great numbers of research men for a period of many years. Very likely the establishment of a diagnostic selection procedure for psychoanalysts will turn out to belong to the most difficult, the most expensive, and the most time-consuming of projects. But suppose, for the sake of argument, it were perfected. In this case I am sure that most training analysts, on second thought, will fight gallantly against its use by our institutes because selection would be completely taken out of their hands and performed instead by specialists who are not psychoanalysts. The psyche-assessors would become super-training analysts, and I am sure that the leaders of the institutes would not like that.

At the time when assessment psychology won its first triumphs the psychologists were so eager to put through laws which would grant them a field of occupation of their own, and the psychoanalysts were so busy formulating laws which would exclude psychologists as competitors for their income, that someone completely forgot to put two eminently important laws into the statute books: First, it is not permitted to communicate the result of a testing, screening, or assessment procedure to any one other than the assessee. Second, every person in authority who governs human fate in a small or large way, such as business executives, army officers above the rank of colonel, senators, university teachers, and training committee members have to make public the results of their assessments.

In order to clarify what I mean, I state concretely that I think it is a perversion when the candidates are 'Rorschached' without giving them the Rorschach results. The natural procedure, I think, is that the training analysts must communicate their findings to their potential analysands. But unfortunately at the crucial time when the assessment psychologists started to feel their oats, such ideas were labeled as crazy, exaggerated, and uncoöperative. And now, after psychology is perfected, we find that it has rationalized the relation of the group to the individual who wishes to belong to it, instead of rationalizing the relation of the individual to be tested to the group. The individual is now so completely dependent upon the group, so perfectly integrated into it, that no ego exists apart from the group any more, and therefore freudian psychoanalysis is no longer necessary. It is hardly even possible any more.

It strikes me that the most natural way of selection would be the following: If I met someone who impressed me as interesting, talented, passionately interested in psychoanalysis, I would try to keep an eye on him. I would see him in seminars or at a party given by one of my colleagues, and I would have an opportunity to hear how he is doing with his psychiatric, psychotherapeutic, or medical cases. When my interest in him has continued for a reasonable length of time I would invite him

to come as guest to the scientific meetings of the Psychoanalytic Society, and to the various seminars, lectures, and so on which the society or the institute is conducting. I would introduce him to my friends in the society and to some of the more experienced members, and I would draw their attention to this potential discovery. Some of them might have heard about him and observed him at his work, whatever that may be. Depending on the nature of his work we would invite him to give a lecture, participate in discussions, or give a paper; or, if he happens to be a psychotherapist, we would offer to control some of his cases. Since he is interested in psychoanalysis he probably will be eager to be psychoanalyzed himself; and depending upon my time and the estimate of my countertransference I would take him for analysis myself or suggest that he get himself a place on someone else's schedule. After a certain time, let us say after one or two years, he will have established some social and professional contacts in addition to his meeting the group and to working with control analysts. A considerable part of the membership of the group will know by this time pretty well whether they like him, and whether they think he is or will be a good psychoanalyst or not. Accordingly, one day the group will vote him in or out.

It is not difficult to recognize some flaws in this system, if you want to call it a system. There are disadvantages in the existing system, too, and my way of dealing with future psychoanalysts has the definite advantage of being just as unpredictable, just such a mixture of irrational application of rational insights, and just as specifically tailored for each case, as is freudian psychoanalysis.

But would we get, in this way, a sufficient number of new members, and would we get the most desirable ones? If we restrict the potential psychoanalysts to a group to be determined by purely extra-psychoanalytic considerations, then of course it is doubtful that we would get a sufficient number of new members. Yet, in this group, we would be as certain of getting the more or less desirable ones as we are now. At the moment, the

first considerations, I repeat, and not the last considerations, in our selection of candidates are externals such as an M.D., psychiatric training, money, priorities. In my scheme the first consideration is: Does the person interest me, and do I bet on him as psychoanalytic material? If the wish of the group is to find a great number of very desirable candidates, then extra-psychoanalytic requirements must not be considered, or at any rate must be considered in last place, with a great readiness on the part of the society or the institute to waive them or find ways of circumventing them; whereas on the prime considerations there should be no compromise at all.

To return to our main question—the training analysis: unfortunately in our system the training analyst is also charged with the duty of deciding when the candidate is ready to attend seminars, when he may be admitted to controls, when the training analysis is to be considered finished. In general, it is largely at his discretion whether the candidate becomes a psychoanalyst or not. The training analyst is not, as freudian method demands, a mere transference figure. He is instead a part of the patient's reality, a powerful and even decisive factor in it. Such a glaring deviation from the classic technique may sometimes be desirable in cases of nonclassic structure—in alcoholism, for example, or a high degree of infantilism; but these cases will rarely be suitable training material. Our system does not even permit the analyst to modify the regulations under which he works. He must take a judge's attitude in every case. By policy and circumstance the institutionalized training analysis thus bears the features of a non-freudian technique.

I should like to call your attention briefly to several additional points that may be relevant to a future evaluation of the personal analysis.

The personal analysis is no barrier against heterodoxy. The inventors of our training system, who had set such anxious hopes in its preventive force, have been definitely proven wrong. It seems quite sufficient for our point if we list only

some of the former trainees of the Berlin Institute: Alexander, Rado, Horney, Fromm, Reich, Fromm-Reichmann.

As I noted earlier the analysand does not learn much about technique in his personal analysis. He grows aware of his analyst's style and personality rather through identification and intuition than by conscious observation; he certainly incorporates some of his stereotypes. But in his work these relics of his own personal analysis are at least as much hindrance as help. Often the wish of the student to know what his analyst thinks and feels and what motivates his technical actions, develops into a serious resistance; and sometimes the analyst's attitude toward his patients is badly influenced by unconscious reactions to his own former analyst.

As the only remedy against so-called blind spots, personal analysis is in my opinion grossly overrated. Perhaps in 1900 no one was able to recognize and accept the œdipus complex without first having dissolved the repressive forces in himself. Then we were blind and could not see certain facts either in ourselves or in others. But even for those days the generalization is incorrect. Freud, and certainly not he alone, was able to find the œdipus complex in his patients before he discovered it, through self-analysis, in himself. Today, a great number of psychiatrists and psychologists have satisfied themselves that the œdipus complex, in Freud's definition, does exist. It would be quite false to claim that they cannot see the complex in others, although they might be completely blinded in relation to themselves. The truth is that only if the repression of the œdipus complex or of any other infantile feature is very intense, and especially if it is surrounded by phobic or psychotic mechanisms, does the proper observation and treatment of neurotic patients become impossible. A psychotherapist, if he happened to be in this condition, would be well advised to arrange for a personal analysis. He would probably feel much better after it, and if he is concerned about his competence as a therapist, he would be more capable of demonstrating it.

We could continue at length to check all arguments advanced in favor of obligatory didactic analysis. In every case we would be forced to conclude that the argument holds in some circumstances but never in all of them.

There exist, as far as I am able to see, only two factors in personal analysis that can bear a fair amount of generalization. First, usually but not always, through personal analysis one can attain that high degree of intimate familiarity with psychological material which the analyst needs. This holds true especially for physicians, whose training in medical schools is almost completely directed at objective phenomena. Personal analysis may give them the necessary good conscience in dealing with the subjective world. Second, the impact and extent of transference reactions can perhaps be fully appreciated only after a personal analysis, although even here a modification seems advisable. The argument applies only if a convincing analysis of the transference has taken place. And I am not really certain whether one must have experienced one's own transference in order to recognize that of the patient.

And yet I would not spend an evening of your time discussing the question: Ought an analyst to have a personal analysis, or must he have one if the problem could be kept within these comparatively narrow borders? It cannot. It is in the nature of law-making that laws must be precise, and apparently their precision can only be insured by the issuance of other laws. It is not enough to insist that every analyst must have a personal analysis. The law-makers will be strongly tempted—and pressured—to qualify and define the meaning of the term 'personal analysis'. Next they will figure out how long the analysis must take, how many weekly sessions it must have, which analysts are qualified to give it and which are not, and on and on in this strain. Soon we find ourselves in our present situation, with the certain promise of worse to come if this law-making trend is not curbed.

In 1924, when I saw the legislators so passionately at work in Berlin, I thought they were, perhaps naturally, animated by

the spirit of the Prussian army. Since those days I have come to understand that institutionalization has nothing to do with that specific spirit, but that the laying down of laws is a hobby of psychoanalysts everywhere. A man is likely to choose as his hobby an activity that compensates him for certain frustrations in his professional life. Now if anyone has to frustrate his power drive, the ego satisfactions and the moral, sadistic components inherent in a law-maker, it is certainly the psychoanalyst during his workdays. And so, in consolation, we are burdened in our international, national, and local organizations with committees over committees; on rules, on standards, on laws and the multitude of their qualifications; we have the whole rigamarole of big business, the army, and any bureaucracy in order to govern a little band of a few hundred generally civilized and pleasant individuals, most of whom are seriously interested in helping themselves and their patients, and in doing some research in their spare hours. But unfortunately, the writing of laws and their application and enforcement turns into a hobby with a vengeance. It takes the life out of psychoanalysis by imposing on it, as we have seen, more and more nonanalytic regulations.

To me it is quite beyond doubt that the slightly distorted transference situation in the personal analysis of candidates is one outcome of these laws and that it has perceptible consequences in almost all cases. Some can be handled easily; in others, the changed transference situation by itself or combined with other factors makes it very difficult or quite impossible to achieve much in the genetic analysis of childhood. Frequently the transferences thus manipulated produce a mixture of psychoanalysis and nonpsychoanalytic therapy.

Occasionally the factual dependence of the student on the judgment and benevolence of his analyst, together with his rebellion against this situation, prolongs the analysis beyond any reason. A long list of difficulties and shortcomings stems from this anomaly of the transference situation, which we—of all people—impose arbitrarily on the didactic analysis.

I am not a perfectionist. Many of our patients live in en-

vironments that are so adverse to the straight psychoanalytic method that we have to compromise. Many of our patients are such thorough conformists, so dependent, so greedy for acceptance, so jealous and competitive, that what to others is fantasy to them becomes reality; they will need a modified kind of psychoanalysis—slightly modified in technique, greatly modified in its goal. But should we take as models for our psychoanalytic schools a situation in which dependence on the good will of authority becomes a reality trait, where ability to conform to rules and schedules becomes the true measure of excellence, where fear and libidinal competition with students are encouraged?

The personal analysis anyhow tends to infantilize the analysand temporarily and to a certain degree. When we incorporate it into a school system in which the student is treated as the object of abstract rules, this infantilism is intensified. When he has to stay in this atmosphere a long time it is made very difficult for him to see psychoanalysis for what it really is—a tool to strengthen one's intellectual, emotional, and social independence.

The justification that is usually given for the setting in which we teach psychoanalysis is twofold: 1, we turn out a fair number of well-trained, competent psychoanalysts; 2, there is no other way to do it when the number of aspirants is so great and the number of good training analysts so small.

Let me make a few closing remarks concerning these arguments. First, of course some people learn psychoanalysis in any setting. That does not prove that we have to invent the most unfavorable situations in which to teach psychoanalysis. Second, suppose we take the constitution of our society seriously. Our members consist of competent psychoanalysts. There is, of course, a certain range of variation in what one calls the gift for psychoanalysis in the commitment to a more or less freudian theory or technique. There is a certain range in the amount of experience. Some members are universally liked. Some are less popular. Some get many referrals from their colleagues; some very few. In certain of our groups there are a few who have the reputation of being outstandingly good. Each group must, of course, have one 'weakest' member. But we possess no way by which we can rationally rank the membership into Good, Very Good, and The Best analysts. Yet strangely, that is exactly what has taken place. The membership of all of our groups is divided into members who are good enough for the simple paying patient and into really good ones who take care of our future membership.

I think that this division of our membership is not justifiable and has proven over the last twenty years to be detrimental to psychoanalysis. It is our training system that intensifies and perpetuates this division. I have never heard an argument for the existence of this class system within the psychoanalytic societies except that our candidates must have the best teachers. What is a good teacher? By what criteria will we decide that question? It obviously cannot be justified that the 'best teachers' decide for themselves and appoint according to their private yardstick who is to join their ranks.

It is inevitable that the analysand—in certain phases of his transference—has exaggerated thoughts about the eminence and professional capacity of his analyst. Frequently remnants of this transference attitude persist long after the analysis. By singling out a few members in each society as the privileged training analysts, implying that they are the best analysts, we confuse fantasy and magic with reality factors to such a degree that we have created turmoil at times in some of our groups. Dr. Sachs, the first training analyst, soon withdrew from all offices in the society and institute. He saw clearly that the position of training analyst is incompatible with any involvement in society or institute politics. If the training analyst combines the transference authority of a father with the power and authority of office, his job as analyst becomes very difficult indeed. In our training system we elevate every training analyst to a power and prestige position. We thereby disturb perceptibly the transference in the personal analysis, whereas in fact

or maybe only in my opinion, under less artificially complicated circumstances, the personal analysis is just as difficult or as easy as every other psychoanalysis. All that one needs to conduct the personal analysis of a colleague is the colleague's coöperation, some experience, and a lot of tact.

If I do not give you any practical suggestions for the solution of these complex situations it is not because I want to evade the issues. Rather it is because I do not feel that the problems involved have been sufficiently discussed and investigated at this time. I have the feeling that the first step on the agenda should be a psychoanalytic evaluation of all the conditions which at present exist in training. Obviously one has to make compromises because every institution can only approximate the ideal. But these compromises must be made with great care and they should always include a system of check and countercheck.

INTERNALIZATION, SEPARATION, MOURNING, AND THE SUPEREGO

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In this paper I shall speak of the superego as a product of internalization, and of internalization in its relations to separation, loss, and mourning. A brief consideration of some aspects of the termination of an analysis will be presented in this context. I shall describe some of the differences and similarities between ego identifications and superego identifications and shall introduce the concept of degrees of internalization, suggesting that the introjects constituting the superego are more on the periphery of the ego system but are capable of mobility within this system and may thus merge into the ego proper and lose their superego character. The proposition will be presented that the superego, an enduring structure whose elements may change, has important relations to the internal representation of the temporal mode future.

As an introduction to the subject it may be useful to recall that for Freud the superego is the heir of the œdipus complex. Introjections and identifications preceding the œdipal phase and preparing the way for its development go into the formation of the ego proper. The origins of the superego are to be found also, according to Freud, in those early identifications which he calls immediate and direct and which are not the outcome of relinquished object cathexes. But the identifications which constitute the superego proper are the outcome of a relinquishment of œdipal objects: they are relinquished as external objects, even as fantasy objects, and are set up in the ego, by which process they become internal objects cathected by the id,—a narcissistic cathexis. This is a process of desexualization in which

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